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Do institutions rule when explaining cross-country divergence? By employing 
regression tree analysis to uncover the existence and nature of multiple development 
clubs and growth regimes, this paper finds that to a large extent they do. However, 
the role of ethnic fractionalization cannot be dismissed. The findings suggest that 
sufficiently high-quality institutions may be necessary for the negative impact on 
development from high levels of ethnic fractionalization to be mitigated. 
Interestingly, I find no role for geographic factors; neither those associated with 
climate nor physical isolation, in explaining divergence. There is also no evidence to 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Are rich and poor countries converging in real per capita income? Previous work in the 
empirical growth literature suggests that the cross-country distribution of income may be polarizing 
(see, for instance, Quah (1997) and Canova (2004)). What factors, therefore, account for the 
existence of persistent divergence in long-run economic performance across countries?  
The primary “work horse” model in the empirical growth literature is the canonical 
neoclassical growth model (see, Solow (1956) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)). In the 
neoclassical framework, long-run levels of development and growth rates around steady state are 
conceived in terms of rates of physical and human capital accumulation, fertility rates, and 
advancements in technology. The recent empirical growth literature has built upon this work by 
recasting the growth process within a system that exhibits a “hierarchy of timescales”
1 whereby 
slower-moving variables determine the evolution of faster-moving variables.  
In this view, the familiar neoclassical determinants of growth described above constitute 
only the “proximate” determinants of growth.  These proximate factors are themselves posited to be 
determined by slow-moving variables such as a country’s geography, the quality of its institutions, 
and the degree of fractionalization (both ethnic and religious) in its society. These latter 
“fundamental determinants” are seen to govern the evolution of proximate variables by shaping the 
incentives and constraints that influence family planning, saving, and schooling decisions.  
There has been much controversy in the empirical literature over attempts to clarify the 
relative empirical salience of these fundamental determinants to growth. While most researchers 
agree that the quality of institutions constitutes an important fundamental determinant, a heated 
debate has arisen over whether factors related to geography have any direct influence on long-run 
                                                 




levels of development, or if geography’s importance is limited solely to its historical role in 
determining the initial quality of institutions that a country inherits at birth. This contentious debate 
has come to be known in the literature as the “institutions versus geography” debate (see, in 
particular, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) and Sachs (2003)). 
Attempts to resolve the institutions versus geography debate have centered largely upon 
efforts to uncover partial correlations between various proxies for each of these three classes of 
fundamental determinants with per capita income or growth rates within a linear framework. 
Moreover, proponents in this debate have sought to interpret this linear regression model as causal, 
so that the main econometric issue is the identification of parameters that are now taken to be 
structural. Inferences are then drawn based upon the economic and statistical significance of the 
corresponding parameter estimates. 
Within this framework, disagreements over the validity of proposed instrumental variables 
(IV’s) and, to a lesser extent, over the appropriateness of proxy variables have proven critical in 
ensuring a lack of resolution to the debate thus far. The current preoccupation of the literature, 
therefore, has been to search for, and to justify various instrumental variables (IV’s) as being valid
2, 
in order to identify structural parameters.  
However, while concerns over the identification of structural parameters are generally 
applicable and certainly well-grounded, the current approach in the literature glosses over a 
potentially wider epistemological failure. That is, by focusing solely on the identification of structural 
parameters within the linear framework, we have, in effect, chosen to ignore the possibility for 
misspecification. For a statistical model to be structural interpretable, however, it would seem 
reasonable that we should require the model under consideration to be “statistically adequate” in 
                                                 
2 A promising solution has been to assert the validity of proposed IV’s by arguing that they are the outcome of historical 




capturing features of the data (in the sense of Spanos (1999)). By ignoring issues of specification 
uncertainty, it becomes unclear, for instance, whether IV methods (even when the most perfect IV’s 
are employed) will actually lead to interpretable results. More generally, it raises questions over how 
results from existing studies should be interpreted. 
In practice, very little attention is actually paid in the literature to the question of whether the 
linear model adequately captures structure in the data
3. One way to see this is to note how little 
effort has been expended to systematically assess the importance of interactions between 
fundamental causes in explaining divergence. In fact, there has been little discussion over exactly 
how these fundamental variables should enter into a regression equation. This blind-spot is 
especially surprising since while the current empirical literature ignores the possibility of 
heterogeneity, the very motivation for the literature itself strongly suggests that heterogeneity should 
be an issue of first-order concern. 
For instance, much of the recent work arguing for an important causal role for geographic 
determinants such as climate, disease, and geographic isolation on long-run development is directly 
motivated by ideas in Diamond (1997). A key message of Diamond, however, is that particular 
features of the geographic environment
4 prevented some populations from successfully transitioning 
from an inferior production technology to a superior one; i.e., from hunter-gathering to agriculture. 
What is especially noteworthy is that this transition from one production technology to another 
engenders a qualitatively discrete change in production possibilities. The suggestion therefore is that 
                                                 
3 An important exception is the work, which was an outgrowth of the seminal paper by Azariadis and Drazen (1990), on 
identifying multiple neoclassical growth regimes (see Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) for a comprehensive survey). 
 
4 Diamond argues that inherent differences between tropical and temperate zones in the variety of plant and animal 
species available for cultivation and domestication contributed to divergent possibilities for the development of 
agriculture for populations in these zones. This endowment effect was exacerbated by the fact that agricultural 
technologies tend to be climate-specific. Plant species and cultivation methods appropriate in one environment did not 
thrive in another so that the diffusion of technology across climate zones (i.e., between North and South) tended to be 




geographic variables such as climate and geographic isolation should be properly viewed as 
threshold variables in the sense that countries are required to have these conditions be favorable 
enough – beyond a set of threshold values – in order to qualify for the better production technology. 
Following Diamond, much of the current growth literature has argued that it is precisely the 
burden of disease, soil infertility, and geographic isolation that has led to a lack of human capital 
accumulation, low agricultural productivity, inaccessibility to trade and technology, and notably an 
overall failure to successfully industrialize (Radelet and Sachs (1998)) in countries in the tropics.  
Relatedly, in perhaps the most explicit articulation of hierarchy of timescale dynamics
5 in the 
growth literature, a growing body of work has sought a “unified” growth theory (see Galor (2005)) 
that explains important regularities in demography that accompany observed endogenous economic 
“take-offs”. Galor and Moav (2002), for instance, present a model where evolutionary pressures 
across a long timescale (i.e.., 10,000 years) determine the distribution of preferences for quality over 
quantity of offspring in the population leading to an endogenous transition from an agriculture-
based production technology to industrialization and thereby a “take-off”. However, the timing of 
the “take-off” may “differ significantly across countries and regions due to historical accidents, as 
well as variation in geographical, cultural, social and institutional factors, trade patterns, colonial 
status, and public policy that have affected the relationship between human capital formation and 
technological progress [Galor, 2005, p. 80]”.  
The above suggests therefore that if we look across a cross section of countries at a point in 
time, we should expect to observe subgroups that correspond to particular “stages of development”. 
In this view, fundamental determinants are more naturally thought of as threshold  variables 
                                                 
5  Brock (2001) points out that a generic property of slow-fast dynamic systems is that the slow variables act as 
bifurcators to the dynamics of the fast variables. Kourtellos (2004) also cites similar approaches in the ecology literature. 
An example is Holling’s Textural Discontinuity Hypothesis (see, Holling (1992)) which posits that slow-moving variables 





classifying countries into groups rather than as continuous covariates whose minute variation 
explains differences in growth at the margin. Few economists, for instance, would attribute the 
differences in economic performance between Norway and Germany to variations in their 
geography or institutions. Nor would this approach be representative of the manner in which 
questions about cross-country divergence are posed. The new timescales literature strongly suggests 
that what one wishes to explain is why groups of countries appear to have such different long-run 
economic fortunes. What deep factors distinguish the development paths of the set of industrialized 
economies from that of Africa or Latin America, for instance? What explains Africa's growth 
tragedy? 
The main contribution of this paper is to take a first stab at the problem of specification 
uncertainty. Broadly, this paper proposes that when there is uncertainty over specification, we 
should consider more general or “flexible” statistical models that nest the “conservative” structural 
model. That is, the model space under consideration should be an appropriate superset that embeds 
the structural model suggested by a conservative interpretation of theory. In effect, the conservative 
structural model would be a re-parameterization or restriction of the more general statistical model. 
The idea is then of a test that would allow the data to reject the restriction (of linearity, for instance). 
Finally, we require that the general model preserve the possibility for structural interpretability once 
specification uncertainty has been properly accounted for by such a test. In this view, the role of 
theory is to place boundaries on our model space. It should also be noted that such a prescription is 
very general; for instance, sample splitting and threshold models, mixture models, varying coefficient 
methods, and Bayesian model averaging (BMA) are all examples of such a framework. More 




methods for such models
6. In this sense, efforts to account for misspecification and to achieve 
identification are both complementary and necessary. 
In this paper, I employ a particular sample splitting and threshold estimation strategy, 
regression tree analysis, to identify the important fundamental growth determinants as well as their 
salient interactions. Regression trees iteratively split the sample of observations into increasingly 
homogeneous subsets. At each stage, a threshold variable is chosen from the set of fundamental 
determinant proxies and a threshold value is chose to facilitate the splitting of the sample. The result 
of the regression tree procedure is to deliver groups of countries whose members share meaningful 
similarities in the way fundamental determinants influence economic outcomes without the need for 
us to impose any a priori structure on the number or nature of these groups.  The results are also 
structurally interpretable in the sense that they reveal the relative importance of particular 
fundamental determinants to countries in each of these groups. 
The findings in the paper provide robust support for the view that institutions and their 
interaction with ethnic fractionalization are central to explaining cross-country economic divergence.  
Higher levels of ethnic fractionalization have no impact on development for the group of countries 
with high quality institutions. For countries with quality of institutions below a threshold level, 
however, greater ethnic fractionalization is associated with substantially lower levels of development. 
Sufficiently high-quality institutions are necessary to mitigate the negative impact on development 
from high levels of ethnic fractionalization. Interestingly, I find no role for geographic factors; 
neither those associated with climate nor geographic isolation, in explaining divergence. There is also 
no evidence to suggest an important role for religious fractionalization. Finally, the findings in this 
                                                 
6 A good example of work in this direction within the sample splitting and threshold estimation context is Caner and 
Hansen (2004)). However, Caner and Hansen’s IV method is limited to endogenous variables in the regression equation 




paper affirm earlier work
7 in the literature that sets apart the development process of Sub-Saharan 
Africa from the rest of the world.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper provides an 
empirical framework for the discussion. I model the timescale effect of fundamental determinants 
on economic performance as a search for the existence of multiple development clubs and growth 
regimes. Section 3 describes the regression tree algorithm employed in this paper; i.e., Generalized 
Unbiased Interaction Detection and Estimation or GUIDE. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the data and 
estimation results respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Development Clubs and Growth Regimes 
 
I model the influence of fundamental determinants on economic outcomes in two ways. 
 
2.1   Development Clubs 
 
I first consider the case where fundamental determinants are the only influence on long-run 
development. This corresponds to regression specifications where it is implicitly assumed that 
proximate factors are fully reducible to fundamental determinants. This approach characterizes 
much of the literature in the “institutions versus geography” debate. We would therefore expect to 
see long-run development levels of countries classified according to thresholds defined by values for 
fundamental determinants
8.  
                                                 
7 See, for instance, Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2004). 
 
8 Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003), which employs Gaussian mixture models, is a closely related work. However, 








1 = . That is,  , jl ∀≠  
      jl AA ∩= ∅       ( 1 )  







= ∪       ( 2 )  
where Z  is the space of fundamental determinants. As a simple example to illustrate how we would 
interpret thresholds in the space of fundamental determinants, let us suppose that fundamental 
determinants took on discrete values. So, suppose  () Geog Frac Instit z , , =  where Instit  takes on values 
{} LI HI, ,  Frac  takes on values {} LF HF, , and Geog takes on values {} Tm Tr, . A possible set of 
partitions is  () () ( ) {} LF HF HI Tm Tr LF LI Tm Tr HF LI Tm Tr , , , , , , , , , , , , . That is, there is a “low quality 
institutions-high fractionalization” partition, a “low quality institutions-low fractionalization” 
partition, and a “high quality institutions” partition. Geography, in this example, is not salient in 
partitioning countries into groups. This example makes clear how partitioning the space of threshold 
variables potentially reveals both the importance of particular threshold variables as well as the role 
of interactions between threshold variables in characterizing heterogeneity.  
Since we are only concerned with explaining levels of long-run development, the regression 
specification within each partition of the fundamental determinants space,  j A , for  b j ,..., 1 = , is 
therefore simply a (piece-wise) constant model corresponding to, 
()
* | j j i i y A z y E = ∈ ,       1,..., jb =     (3)   
                                                                                                                                                             
able to distinguish the relative importance to development of the three classes of fundamental determinants. This paper 





where  i y  is real per capita income for country i, and  Z zi ∈  is the vector of values for fundamental 
determinants for country i. The number of development clubs in this case is b . One of the tasks of 
estimation will be to uncover the exact value of b .  
 
2.2   Multiple Growth Regimes 
 
Next, I explicitly model the effects of fundamental determinants in terms of their role in 
driving heterogeneity in production functions within the context of the canonical neoclassical 
growth model. Formally, suppose the production function for each country i is given by, 
()
j
ii yf k ε =    iff    ij z A ∈ ,  1,..., jb =      (4) 
where y  is real per capita income,  fε  is a neoclassical production function, k  is a vector of per 
capita capital stocks that all depreciate at a common rate, δ , and   z Z ∈  is the vector of 
fundamental determinants.  
As shown in Figure 1, this simple model implies the existence of multiple steady state values 
for per capita income defined by fundamental determinant thresholds. If we assume further that the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas, then, following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), growth 
around each steady state would be given to a first order approximation by a growth regime
9 such as  
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9 There is, in fact, substantial support in the empirical growth literature for the existence of multiple growth regimes. 
Canova (2004), Desdoigts (1999), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001) all find 




Here,  i g  is the difference in log per capita real GDP between the start and end years of a 
given time interval for country i, 
k
i s  and 
h
i s  are, respectively, the average rates of physical and 
human capital accumulation across the time interval, () ξ δ + + i n  is the sum of, respectively, the 
average population growth rate across the time interval, the depreciation rate for physical and 
human capital, and the rate of exogenous technological growth, 
0
i y  is per capita real GDP in the 
initial year, and ε  is a mean 0, variance 
2
j σ  innovation. The coefficient on log initial per capita 
GDP, 
0
j β , if negative, is typically interpreted as an indication of how quickly poorer countries are 
catching up with richer countries within the group. 
 
3.  Regression Tree Analysis and Generalized Unbiased Interaction Detection and 
Estimation (GUIDE) 
 
Our task is therefore to estimate the number of, respectively, development clubs or growth 
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Regression tree analysis provides a computationally efficient method for fulfilling this 
purpose
10. Regression tree methods are standard in the statistical learning literature and bear deep 
similarities to recent sample splitting and threshold estimation methods in the econometrics 
literature (see, in particular, Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002) and Hansen (2000)). Regression tree 
                                                 
10  In terms of methodology, my approach is closest to Durlauf and Johnson (1995) who also use regression tree 





methods are appropriate tools for the job because they routinely handle the case of multiple 
threshold variables as well as multiple thresholds. They have also been shown to be consistent in the 
sense that as the number of observations gets large, regression trees reproduce the “true” set of 
sample splits (see Breiman, Friedman, Olsen, and Stone (1984)). Their weakness, however, lies in the 
lack of available asymptotic results that would be useful for conducting inference on threshold 
variable choices and threshold value estimates. The econometrics literature has sought to correct this 
within the context of test-based sequential sample splitting models (see Hansen (1999, 2000)). 
However, results such as confidence intervals derived in these settings are generally restricted to the 
single threshold variable-single threshold case. Nevertheless, our regression tree results (see Section 
5) confirm, most fortuitously, that these inferential results are applicable in the multiple regimes 
context. I therefore also report results for confidence intervals for threshold estimates using 
Hansen’s methodology in Section 5 below. 
The specific regression tree algorithm I employ to uncover development clubs and growth 
regimes is GUIDE. Loh (2002) is the key reference. GUIDE is an extension of the Classification 
and Regression Tree (CART) methodology by Breiman, et al. (1984). GUIDE’s innovation is to 
minimize potential biases in variable selection and interaction detection in CART. These biases arise 
because the “greedy” search algorithm employed by CART for tree splitting selects threshold 
variables with larger support points more frequently regardless of fit (see Doyle (1973)). GUIDE 
overcomes the bias problem by replacing the “greedy” search algorithm with a simple LM test of 
linear fit. 
GUIDE builds a tree by employing the following tree building algorithm: First start with the 
set of all observations. To locate a threshold variable, GUIDE first fits the regression equation (e.g. 




contingency table for each candidate threshold variable (each fundamental determinant variable in 
this case) with the latter’s support partitioned into quartiles as the columns of the contingency table, 
and negative or positive regression residuals as the rows. Each cell of the contingency table contains 
a count for the number of regression residuals that are either positive or negative for observations 
that correspond to each quartile as given by the columns of the contingency table. A Chi-square test 
for linear fit is then carried out to determine if there is evidence of curvature. This is done for each 
candidate threshold variable. The p-values are obtained using bootstrap. The candidate threshold 
variable corresponding to the lowest p-value is selected to split the data for this stage of the tree. 
Once a threshold variable has been selected, a threshold value is arrived at by finding a value for the 
threshold variable that minimizes the joint classical linear regression sum of squared errors across 
the resulting two subgroups. Parameters for the regression equation are estimated by concentration. 
GUIDE then applies the above threshold selection procedure iteratively to each newly 
formed subgroup. At each stage, the given subset of observations is further divided into two 
subgroups. The procedure stops only after a pre-set value for the minimum number of observations 
in a subgroup has been breached. The result is the construction of an “overly large” tree. To deal 
with the problem of over-fitting, the overly large tree is then pruned back using a criterion, similar to 
a generalized information criterion, that maximizes overall fit while penalizing for complexity (i.e., 
the number of subgroups) to arrive at the final tree.  
Figure 2, due to Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001), provides a simple schematic to 
show what a regression tree algorithm such as GUIDE accomplishes. In experiments, Loh (2002) 
shows that there is negligible bias in the selection of threshold variables. This provides some 
confidence in the interpretability of the uncovered structure in small samples. Loh also shows that 




learning algorithms across a wide range of data sets. In particular, with bootstrap aggregation, 
GUIDE provides the best predictive performance out of the set of learning algorithms that delivers 
interpretable structure (including multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS)). The reader is 




The dependent variable for the development clubs regression is the log of per capita real 
purchasing power-adjusted GDP
11 for 1999 for each country. Since this is a piece-wise constant 
regression model, the independent variables are proxies for fundamental determinants (described 
below) that are used for tree-splitting.  
For the growth regimes regression, we employ panel data for each country over two 20-year 
time intervals, 1960-79 and 1980-99. The regression model in this case is piece-wise linear. The 
dependent variable is the difference between the logs of real per capita GDP for the start and end 
years of each of these intervals. Three of the five covariates that enter the (piece-wise) regression 
equation linearly, the log net depreciation rate
12 (MNGD), log investment share (MINV), and log 
schooling (MSCH15) are logs of averages taken across each of the two time intervals. The fourth 
covariate, log initial per capita income (MGDP0), is the log of real per capita GDP for the initial 
year in each of the two time intervals. Finally, a dummy variable for the period 1960-79 (DUM6079) 
                                                 
11 GDP figures used in this paper correspond to RGDPL in PWT 6.1. RGDPL is obtained by adding up consumption, 
investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year. The given year components are 
obtained by extrapolating the 1996 values in international dollars from the Geary aggregation using national growth 
rates. It is a fixed base index where the reference year is 1996. 
 
12 The net depreciation rate refers to the sum of the population growth rate, the rate of depreciation of physical and 
human capital, and the exogenous rate of technological change. By convention, the sum of the latter two variables is set 





is also included. The schooling variable corresponds to the “average years of secondary and higher 
level schooling for males aged 15 and above” calculated using data from Barro and Lee (2000). All 
of the other national accounting data come from the recently released Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 
6.1) dataset (see Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)). We turn now to data for geography, 
institutions, and fractionalization.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, following Diamond’s (1997) seminal work, some growth 
economists have recently argued that disadvantageous geography has long-term consequences for a 
country’s development (see Bloom and Sachs (1998) for a comprehensive treatise). In particular, the 
impact of climate on agricultural productivity and disease ecology, and consequently on health, 
educational achievement, productivity, and the nature of policy regimes
13, has taken on a prominent 
role in this new literature. To proxy for climate, I use data from Harvard University’s Center for 
International Development (CID) on the percentage of a country’s land area that is classified as a 
tropical eco-zone (ZTROPICS). Masters and McMillan (2001) have also argued strongly for an 
important role for the prevalence of ground frost during the winter season for soil renewal and 
fertility as well as in eradicating disease vectors. I include their most favored variable, the proportion 
of a country’s land area that experiences more than 5 frost-days per month in winter (FROST5), as 
an alternative proxy for climate. Other proponents of geography have emphasized the role of 
geographic isolation in inhibiting development (see, Frankel and Romer (1999) and Radelet and 
Sachs (1998)). I use data (also from the CID) measuring the percentage of a country’s land area 
within 100 km of an ice-free coast (LCR100KM) to proxy for geographic isolation
14.  
                                                 
13 For example, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) argue that it is precisely the poor natural endowments of countries in 
the tropics that lead “the [tax revenue maximizing] sovereign [to trade] quick gain for future loss”. Masters and McMillan 
(2000) and McMillan (2001) put forth similar views in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
14 Separating the two dimensions of geographic heterogeneity, climate and geographic isolation, in empirical exercises as 
opposed to applying a generalized geographic proxy for both, like latitude, is strongly advocated by the literature (see, 




The case for the importance of economic institutions in affecting long-run growth and 
development outcomes arose to some extent as a response to this new “geographic determinism”. A 
large number of studies
15 have shown that the quality of institutions has potentially crucial 
consequences for investment and productivity. It has also been posited that volatile macroeconomic 
policies, resulting in uncertainty in the economic environment, is likely to be symptomatic
16 of poor 
underlying institutional quality (see, in particular, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen 
(2003)). The main argument here is that economic performance is a direct consequence of economic 
institutions, so all other factors are ultimately interesting only in the context of how they affect the 
evolution of such economic institutions. The prediction therefore is that economic performance will 
be conditionally independent of factors like geography once economic institutions are accounted for. 
Two variables are considered as alternative measures of the quality of institutions. The first, 
ICRG8497, measures the average level of country risk across the years 1984 to 1997. This is a 
comprehensive measure of institutional quality that aggregates across five variables measuring the 
quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation risk, and 
repudiation of contracts by government. The second, EXPROP8497, measures specifically the risk 
of expropriation. Both of these variables come from the IRIS-3 dataset by Knack and Keefer. The 
decision to use both variables derives from the desire to facilitate the comparability of results across 
work in the literature. The correlation between these variables is very high at over 0.8. 
Finally, building on work by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and others, some researchers have 
attributed under-development to the multiplicity of population subgroups; defined by differences in 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
15 See, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Hall and Jones (1999), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), and Knack and Keefer (1995). 
 
16 As Easterly and Levine (2002) put it, “Bad policies would be kind of like a high fever from a bacterial infection. 





socio-cultural factors such as racial features, language, and religion, within a country. Proponents of 
fractionalization do contend that greater polarization potentially leads to competitive rent seeking 
activities by groups in power at the expense of society as a whole, leading thereby to a degradation 
of economic institutions. However, they also argue that fractionalization has important implications 
for development outside of its effects on the institutionally-driven incentives to produce or divert. 
High levels of fractionalization could lead to disagreements over the desirability of the type and level 
of public goods to be provided leading to a socially suboptimal allocation of growth-critical public 
goods such as public schooling and physical infrastructure. This could occur because some public 
goods are viewed as benefiting one group more than another. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), for 
instance, find that public goods provision is negatively correlated with fractionalization using census 
data. Also, since production is typically a joint activity across social groups, the willingness to reach a 
consensus and to cooperate in production becomes a factor in determining production possibilities. 
However, there is evidence that trust does not translate easily across ethnic lines (see, for instance, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Glaeser, Laibson, Sheinkman, and Soutter (2000)).  
Easterly and Levine (1997) introduced the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, ELF60, as 
a measure of ethnic fractionalization. ELF60 measures the probability in 1960 that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic subgroup. Until 
recently, ELF60 featured prominently as the default proxy choice for fractionalization. In a recent 
paper, Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) argue that linguistic diversity 
alone may not adequately capture the different aspects of fractionalization in society. In particular, 
they argue that the degree to which differences in racial features, language, or religion approximate 
such fractionalization may vary from country to country. They use data from the Encyclopedia 




combines racial and linguistic characteristics (ETHNIC), the second is based on data for shares of 
languages spoken as “mother tongues” (LANG), and the third describes differences in religion 
(RELIG). I employ all four measures of fractionalization in the tree regressions in ways made clear 
below.  
Table 1 provides a detailed description as well as summary statistics for proxies for the three 




Since GUIDE selects threshold variables with negligible bias, I include in my benchmark 
regression trees for both development clubs and growth regimes all nine fundamental determinant 
variables. To affirm the robustness of the benchmark tree structures, I further employ eight different 
combinations of fundamental determinant variables for each series of regression exercises; i.e., for 
development clubs and for growth regimes. These eight additional models (Models 1-8) and the 
benchmark (Model 0) are described in Table 2. All eight models include the proxy for geographic 
isolation (LCR100KM). Differences across models are due to different configurations of climate, 
institutions, and fractionalization variables. Specifically, I interchange the two climate variables as 
well as the two quality of institutions variables, and use ELF60 and Alesina et al.’s set of ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious fractionalization variables as substitutes for each other across these models.  
We hope to observe two forms of robustness by using different combinations of threshold 
variables. First, we want to affirm that threshold variable selection by GUIDE is in fact unbiased. 
We expect that the uncovered structure should not vary dramatically across models employing 




results are robust to small changes in the data set generated by the inclusion or exclusion of 
countries due to variations in missing values across variables. The effective number of observations 
for the development clubs and growth regimes exercises after eliminating rows with missing values 
range from 84 to 98 for the former and from 150 to 160 for the latter. As mentioned above, we also 
report 95% confidence intervals for threshold value estimates using Hansen’s methodology. While 
the tree structures generated by GUIDE for development clubs and growth regimes offer us an 
interpretable relationship between fundamental determinants and economic performance, the 
confidence bounds provide us with a measure of the uncertainty over the classification of particular 
countries into each club or regime. 
 
5.1   Results for Development Clubs 
 
The regression tree results provide robust support for the existence of three development 
clubs. Figure 3(a) provides a schematic characterization of these development clubs. There are two 
main findings. The first is that the quality of institutions, and, in particular, their interaction with 
ethnic fractionalization, is the robust determinants that drive long-run differences in economic 
development. That is, the data rejects linearity in favor of multiple (two) development thresholds. 
For the group of countries with quality of institutions above a threshold value 
(EXPROP8497>8.40), ethnic fractionalization has no impact on development whereas for countries 
that have quality of institutions below the threshold, having levels of ethnic fractionalization above a 
threshold value (ELF60>0.605) is associated with substantially lower levels of development.  
The predicted level of real per capita GDP for the high quality institutions group of 




Further, the low quality institutions-low ethnic fractionalization group enjoys three times the 
predicted income of the group with high ethnic fractionalization. Interestingly, religious pluralism at 
least as measured by Alesina et al.’s religious fractionalization variable (RELIG) does not appear to 
have an important role in explaining divergence
17. 
The second finding is that geography plays no role in explaining divergence in long-run 
levels of development once institutions and fractionalization are controlled for. Neither factors 
related to climate nor those related to geographic isolation are identified by the regression trees as 
being important threshold variables. The results lend partial support therefore to work such as 
Rodrik et al. (2002) that suggest that once institutions are controlled for, factors such as climate and 
openness (which we relate to geographic accessibility in this study) are no longer significant 
determinants of development outcomes.  
These results are robust to variation in the set of candidate threshold variables. Table 3 
describes, for each of the eight combination of fundamental determinant variables (Models 1-8) 
discussed above, the partitioning of the joint support of these variables by the regression tree to 
obtain development clubs. It also lists the predicted per capita income levels for countries in each 
development club. The results are fully consistent with those we obtained for our benchmark model. 
I now organize the discussion of my results in the context of regions of the world. Table 5 
gives the breakdown of countries by development clubs and regions for each of the tree regression 
results (for Models 0 to 8) shown in Table 3. The number in each cell in Table 5 identifies the 
corresponding country as belonging to the development club of the same number in Table 3. Figure 
                                                 
17 This stands in contrasts, to some extend, with recent work that has found a correlation between religiosity and 
economic performance (see, for instance, Barro and McCleary (2003)). However, we should not overstate this point, 
since Alesina et al.’s RELIG variable specifically measures religious fractionalization and tells us nothing about the 
relationship between religious beliefs and development. The role of culture and religion in determining economic 




3(b) shows Hansen’s 95% confidence intervals for the first and second threshold splits for the 
benchmark model (see Figure 3(a)). 
Unsurprisingly, western industrialized economies (Western European countries and their 
offshoots) are consistently classified as members of the development club with the highest level of 
predicted per capita income
18. We are also confident that these countries are correctly classified into 
this group since they register above the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the quality 
of institutions (EXPROP8497) threshold. It should be noted, however, that some countries in this 
group also have relatively high levels of ethnic fractionalization. For instance, both Easterly and 
Levine’s ethno-linguistic index (ELF60) and Alesina et al.’s ETHNIC variable place Canada’s degree 
of ethnic fractionalization at levels higher than those of some Sub-Saharan African countries (e.g., 
Ethiopia, Malawi, and Mali). Other countries like Belgium, Switzerland, and the US, have ethnic 
fractionalization levels that are close to the threshold value for the low quality institutions-high 
ethnic fractionalization development club. Western industrialized countries, however, generally have 
the highest quality institutions compared to the rest of the world. The result therefore lends support 
to the view that better quality institutions potentially mitigate any negative effects from higher levels 
of diversity.  
The picture for Asia is more complex. A handful of Asian countries, Hong Kong, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea
19, and Singapore (as well as Taiwan) routinely belong to the development club 
with the highest predicted income. They also come in above the 95% confidence interval for the 
quality of institutions threshold. However, the majority of these are essentially small island states. 
                                                 
18 The exception is Greece which occasionally gets classified along with members of the second highest predicted 
income club. 
 
19 The Republic of Korea is marginally displaced into the next richest development club for model 1. However, it should 
be noted that the Republic of Korea tends to enter lower in quality of institutions ratings not through its own failings, 





Other Asian countries like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines tend to fall into the 
development club with the lowest predicted income (the low quality institutions-high ethnic 
fractionalization club). While there may be some uncertainty over whether the two largest of these 
countries (India and Indonesia) were correctly classified, the 95% confidence bounds for 
EXPROP8497 suggest that Pakistan and the Philippines were correctly classified as belonging to 
that group. 
Malaysia, however, presents itself as a particularly interesting case. Malaysia frequently finds 
itself in the development club with either the highest or the next highest level of predicted income 
despite its high level of ethnic fractionalization. With values for ELF60 and ETHNIC at 0.79 and 
0.59 respectively, Malaysia’s level of ethnic fractionalization either dominates or compares with 
those of poor Asian countries
20. In fact, for models where ELF60 was used, if the quality of 
Malaysia’s institutions had been low enough, its high level of ethnic fractionalization would have 
placed it in the development club with the lowest predicted income (as is the case with our 
benchmark). This holds out hope for developing countries that good institutions are potentially able 
to overcome disadvantages posed by a more diverse population. 
Turning now to the Middle East and North Africa, we see that these countries are not 
plagued with high levels of diversity. However, their low institutional quality places them in the 
middle-income (low quality institutions-low ethnic fractionalization) development club.  
A similar situation applies to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Here again, the 
story is clearly one of institutions. With only a few exceptions like Guatemala and Paraguay, ethnic 
fractionalization is generally low (in the data) for this group of countries. What occasionally 
separates countries like Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica from the other Latin American and Caribbean 
                                                 
20 Values for ELF60 and ETHNIC for India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines are, respectively, 0.89 and 0.82, 





countries are institutions of moderately higher quality. In fact, the data suggests a few other 
countries in this region have institutions that are close to the threshold value (in particular, 
Venezuela and Mexico). This holds out hope that policies targeted at improving institutions would 
result in sizeable pay-offs for these countries. Table 3 indicates that the predicted per capita income 
for the high quality institutions development club is, on average, roughly 4 times that that of the low 
quality institutions-low ethnic fractionalization development club. 
Finally, let us turn to Sub-Saharan Africa. This region suffers from a confluence of negative 
factors from having extreme low levels of institutional quality, some of the highest levels of ethnic 
fractionalization, and a landlocked interior. These problems are to a large extent part of the sub-
continent’s colonial legacy. Present day African political boundaries did not arise naturally but 
instead were arbitrarily drawn up during de-colonization. In many cases these artificial borders 
encompassed groups of people with little in common culturally or sociologically
21.  
The results highlight the influence of Africa’s past on its future. With few exceptions, 
notably Botswana, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
consistently classified into the group of countries with the lowest predicted income levels (the low 
quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization development club). And, of the exceptions, the 95% 
confidence bounds for EXPROP8497 indicate that only Botswana may have in fact been a high 
predicted income country (i.e., a group 3 country) that was misclassified. In fact, the confidence 
bounds for EXPROP8497 and ELF60 together provide strong evidence that low-quality institutions 
coupled with high ethnic fractionalization explains the dismal performance of Sub-Saharan Africa as 
a region. 
                                                 
21 In Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sudan, for instance, different ethic groups were simply forced to co-exist. Conversely, in 




What is particularly surprising is that there is no evidence to suggest that climate-related 
factors are at the root of Africa’s under-development. This is in contrast to a large body of work in 
the literature suggesting such a link. The findings here do not support the conclusion that “the 
tropics are damned not just, or even mainly, by bad policies, but by difficult inherent conditions 
[Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1999]”. In fact, the results in this paper point strongly to the 
possibility that Africa’s ills are fundamentally socio-political in nature. In particular, the results agree 
with those of Easterly and Levine (1997) citing the importance of high levels of ethnic 
fractionalization in explaining Africa’s poor performance.  
 
5.2  Results for Growth Regimes 
 
Table 4(a) details growth regimes for the benchmark (Model 0) and also for tree regressions 
utilizing each of the eight combinations of fundamental variables (Models 1-8). I find evidence for 
the existence of two growth regimes. The results, in this case, suggest that institutions are of first-
order importance in determining economic outcomes. Out of the nine trees, seven, including the 
benchmark, routinely separate a set of high quality institution countries from the rest of the world. 
Table 7 provides the regression estimates for the nine models as well as ordinary least squares 
estimates for the standard (unconstrained) Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (MRW) growth regression 
with homogenous coefficients. The country breakdowns for each model are shown in Table 6. 
From the tree regression results in Table 7, we see that there is substantial parameter 
heterogeneity across the two growth regimes. Population growth appears to have a much larger 
negative impact on low quality institutions countries than high quality institutions ones. The 




former regime compared to the latter. The coefficient for log investment share (MINV) is also much 
larger for the high quality institutions regime compared to the low quality institutions regime (also 
around twice as large). There is more ambiguity over the coefficient for log schooling (MSCH25) 
with some models suggesting that schooling is more important to low quality institutions countries 
(Models 1 and 3) and others, including the benchmark, that it is more important to countries with 
high quality institutions (Models 0, 4, 6, 7 and 8).  
The 95% confidence bounds for the threshold split (see Figure 4(b)) suggest that the 
classification of countries into the two regimes exhibited some uncertainty but was nevertheless 
reasonably accurate; a quarter of all countries fell within the bounds. Three features are evident 
when comparing the country breakdowns for growth regimes (Table 6) with those for development 
clubs (Table 5). First, we see that countries that were classified as members of the development club 
with the highest predicted income (high quality institutions group) all conform to the good quality 
institutions growth regime. Second, countries that were classified as members of the development 
club with the lowest predicted income (low quality institutions-high ethnic fractionalization group) 
remained predominantly within the low quality institutions growth regime. The exceptions 
comprised a handful of Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) that went from 
the lowest predicted income development club to the high quality institutions growth regime. With 
few exceptions, Sub-Saharan African countries were classified into the low quality institutions 
regime. Finally, members of the middle income development club (low quality institutions-low 
ethnic fractionalization group) were distributed primarily into the low quality institutions regime 
with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, and Botswana.  
There are at least two explanations for the disparity between the number of development 




interpretation of the various regressions trees. If we view the development clubs regression as 
primarily an exploratory exercise to uncover patterns in the data, then the reason for the disparity in 
groupings may be attributed to the possibility that countries in the low quality institutions regime are 
simply not close enough to the long-run steady state distribution for the development club 
groupings to converge into agreement with the growth regimes.  
There is some evidence for this view. The estimates for the coefficient to initial income 
(MGDP0) for the low quality institutions growth regime are significant
22, negative, and about a third 
in absolute value of those for the high quality institutions regime. This suggests that the rate of 
convergence is substantially slower for low quality institutions countries compared to those with 
high quality institutions. The large number of development clubs may, therefore, simply reflect 
transient heterogeneity that will be resolved in the long-run. That is, our results suggest a 
polarization of the middle-class in the long-run to conform to the findings for two growth regimes. 
This story is consistent with findings of “twin peak”-ness in studies on the evolution of the 
distribution of cross-country income (see, for example, Quah (1997)). As we noted above, we find 
like those studies evidence for persistence; since all rich countries remain in the high quality 
institutions growth regime while most poor countries remain in the low quality growth regimes, for 
growth “miracles”; i.e., those countries going from the low and middle income development club to 
the high quality growth regime, and for growth “disasters”; i.e., those countries going from the 
middle income development club to the low quality growth regime. 
On the other hand, if we maintain that the development clubs uncovered by our tree 
regressions do not simply reveal patterns in the data, but are, in fact, delivering long-run predictions 
for levels of development, then the difference between the number of growth regimes and 
                                                 





development clubs may suggest that the MRW specification does better at describing the growth 
processes of industrialized economies than less developed ones. In particular, the dissipation of 
countries in the low quality institutions regime into multiple development clubs suggests in this case 
that there exists (residual) heterogeneity in the growth process of less developed countries that may 
not be well-captured by the MRW regression specification. If this is true, then more attention needs 




This paper attempts to provide a deeper understanding of how fundamental determinants 
interact to hinder or facilitate development outcomes for different groups of countries. Such a view 
is not possible with mono-causal approaches that ignore the possibility of heterogeneity in economic 
processes.  
I find that institutions play a central role in accounting for the divergence in cross-country 
growth experiences. The results for development clubs point further to a key role for ethnic 
fractionalization in hindering long-run development. The findings suggest that more effort needs to 
be made to understand the connection between ethnic fractionalization and institutional quality, and 
their impact on development. The preliminary analysis suggests that sufficiently high quality 
institutions may be necessary if the negative impact on economic outcomes from higher levels of 
ethnic fractionalization is to be mitigated.  
Finally, I find no role for geography in hindering the development of Sub-Saharan African 
countries. While one has to be extremely cautious in extracting policy implications from growth 




served by improved institutions and policies to promote nation-building across ethnic lines rather 
than policies aimed at mitigating the effects of the physical environment. Specifically, the findings in 
this paper do not support the view that policies aimed at eradicating tropical diseases like malaria or 
at advancing know-how in agriculture in the tropics would lead directly to significant improvements 
in development prospects for the region
23. There are simply no “magic bullet” solutions to Africa’s 
problems. 
                                                 
23 An important caveat to the above is the economic burden of HIV/AIDS on African development. The data used in 
this study is not able to properly address this issue. While it has been suggested that the long-term economic implications 
of HIV/AIDS may not be as bad as initially feared, or may even potentially be beneficial to long-run development (see 
Young (2004)), further study is needed to affirm the robustness of these conclusions. Treating HIV/AIDS as being 
qualitatively identical to malaria, however, arguably misses the social dimension of its transmission (see, for example, 
Kremer (1996)). The position of this paper is therefore that current studies emphasizing the role of climate on 
development are unable to speak to this issue, and that policy implications derived from such work are only incidentally 
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This section reproduces the key algorithms used in the GUIDE tree regression software. Loh (2002) provides 
more details about GUIDE as well as a description of other tree generating options within GUIDE. 
 
First, define the following classes of covariate variables: 
 
·  n-variable: a numerical-valued predictor used to fit the terminal node regression model and to split the 
nodes in the tree; 
·  f-variable: a numerical-valued predictor used to fit the terminal node regression model but not to split 
the nodes in the tree; 
·  s-variable: a numerical-valued predictor used to split the nodes in the tree but not to fit the terminal 
node regression model; 
·  c-variable: a categorical predictor used to split the nodes in the tree but not to fit the terminal node 
regression model. 
 
The first two algorithms determine the choice of the splitting variable at each node of the tree. 
 
Algorithm 1: Chi-square tests for linear fit. 
1.  Obtain the residuals from a linear model fitted to the n- and f-variables, leaving out the s- and c-variables. 
2.  For each n-variable, divide the data into four groups at the sample quartile; construct a 2 x 4 contingency table 
with the signs of the residuals (positive versus non-positive) as rows and the groups as columns; count the 
number of observations in each cell and compute the 
2 χ -statistic and its theoretical p-value from a 
2
3 χ  
distribution. 
3.  Do the same for each s- and c-variable. For the latter, the categories of the variable form the columns of the 
table. Columns with zero column totals are omitted. 
4.  To detect interactions between each pair of n-variables  () , ij XX , divide the () , ij XX -space into four 
quadrants by splitting the range of each variable into two halves at the sample median; construct a 2 x 4 
contingency table using the residual signs as rows and the quadrants as columns; compute the 
2 χ -statistic and 
p-value. Again, columns with zero column totals are omitted. 
5.  Do the same for each pair of s-variables. 
6.  Also do the same for each pair of c-variables using their value pairs to divide the sample space. For example, if 
i X  and  j X  take  i c  and  j c  unique values, respectively, the 
2 χ -statistic and p-value are computed from a 




7.  Compute a 
2 χ -statistic and p-value for each pair () , ij XX  where  i X  is an n-variable and  j X  is a c-
variable. If  j X  has c categories, the table has 2 rows and number of columns equal to 2c less the number of 
zero columns. 
8.  Similarly, compute a 
2 χ -statistic and p-value for each pair () , ij XX  where  i X  is an s-variable and  j X  is a 
c-variable. 
9.  Finally, do the same for each pair where  X  is an s-variable and  j X  is an n-variable as in step 4. 
 
Algorithm 2: Choosing the splitting variable. 
  
1.  Note that 9 sets of Chi-square tests are computed: 3 sets to detect curvature in the n-, s-, and c-variables, 3 sets 
to detect interactions between pairs of variables of the same type, and 3 sets to detect interactions between 
pairs of predictors of different types. 
2.  If the smallest p-value comes from a curvature test, the associated variable is selected to split the node. 
3.  Suppose instead that a pair of variables is selected because their interaction test is the most significant among 
the curvature and interaction tests. 
4.  If neither is a n-variable, choose the one with the smaller curvature p-value. 
5.  If both are n-variables, temporarily split the node along the sample mean of each variable; choose the variable 
whose split yields the smaller total SSE. 
6.  If exactly one is an n-variable, choose the other variable. 
  
Once a splitting variable (call it  j X ) has been chosen, we need to determine the split value for that variable. 
This is done in the next algorithm. 
 
Algorithm 3: Choosing the split value. 
  
1.  Consider the two partitions of the sample space Y x X defined as follows,   
() ( ) { } 1 ,|
ji
ii j As y X YXx s =∈ × ≤ 
() ( ) { } 2 ,|
ji
ii j As y X YXx s =∈ × > 
where  1,..., in =  indexes observations and 
i
jj x X ∈  for all i. 




3.  Let  ()
1
, ˆ
js β  be the OLS estimator of the regression of Y on X for the subset of observations that conforms to the 
partition  () 1
j As , and  ()
2
, ˆ
js β  be the OLS estimator of the regression of Y on X for observations conforming to 
partition  () 2
j As . 
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To grow a tree, therefore, GUIDE starts with the set of all observations and applies the three algorithms above 
to find a splitting variable and a split value leaving two mutually exclusive subsets of observations the union of which 
forms the set of all observations. It then continues to apply this same procedure to each of the resultant subsets, and 
then to the subsets of observations resulting from those, and so forth iteratively until the number of observations in the 
subset falls below a certain predetermined value. In our exercises, we take this minimum number of observations to be 
the default value set by GUIDE. After the tree is grown, it has to be “pruned” in order to avoid over-fitting the data. 
This is done using Cost Complexity pruning. 
 
Algorithm 4: Cost Complexity Pruning 
  
1.  First denote the fully-grown tree to be pruned as  0 T . Now, consider a sub-tree  0 TT ≺  with b terminal nodes. 
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3.  The idea behind the use of the Cost Complexity criterion is to attempt to minimize SSR but to penalize over-
fitting through the use of an overly complex tree. 
4.  Denote the tree for which  () CT α  is minimized (for given α ) as  0 TT α ≺ . 
5.  The SSR for Tα  is obtained by V-fold cross-validation. 
6.  Locate the tree for which α  minimizes the cross-validated SSR. 
7.   Choose the smallest tree within one standard error of the smallest cross-validated SSR (this could be the tree 
that minimizes the cross-validated SSR). 
 
For the GUIDE generated trees reported in this paper, V was set to the maximum value available; i.e., the 





Figure 1: Multiple Growth Regimes
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Figure 3(a)*: Tree Diagram Showing Development Clubs
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1960-99 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the level of real per capita 
GDP predicted by the tree regression.


















Threshold Variable         EXPROP8497 
Threshold Estimate                 8.3846154  














Threshold Variable         ELF60 
Threshold Estimate                0.58999997  















Figure 4(a)*: Tree Diagram Showing Multiple Growth Regimes
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node. Please refer to Table 4 for the list of 
countries for each growth regime, and to Table 7 for the tree regression estimates of coefficients to 
neoclassical growth proximates.










Threshold Variable         EXPROP8497 
Threshold Estimate                7.4928571  












Variables  EXPROP8497 ICRG8497 FROST5 ZTROPICS LCR100KM ELF60  ETHNIC LANG RELIG 
                        
Min.  3.807 2.342  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.002  0.002 
Max.  10.000 9.957  1.000 1.000 94.000 0.930 0.930 0.923  0.860 
Mean  7.417 6.286  0.439 0.167  1.101 0.424  0.434 0.391  0.437 
Median  7.300 5.855  0.141 0.000  0.392 0.430  0.418 0.363  0.460 
Std. Dev.  1.604 1.942  0.462 0.259  7.646 0.298  0.254 0.286  0.234 
                             
                                                 
#  Description of Fundamental Determinant Variables: 
1. FROST5: Proportion of a country’s land area that experiences more than 5 frost-days per month in winter. 
2. ZTROPICS: Percentage of a country's land area that is classified as a tropical eco-zone. 
3. LCR100KM: Percentage of a country's land area within 100 km of ice-free coast. Calculated using 100 km from ice-free coast or navigable river buffer (created in 
ArcView using Plate Caree equidistant projection). 
4. EXPROP8497: Risk of Expropriation of Private Investment; annual average calculated over the years ranging 1984-97. This variable evaluates the risk “outright 
confiscation and forced nationalization” of property. Lower ratings “are given to countries where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event.” 
5. ICRG8497: International Country Risk Guide Index; annual average calculated over the years ranging 1984-97. This is a broad measure of institutional quality which 
aggregates across five variables measuring (1) the quality of the bureaucracy, (2) corruption in government, (3) rule of law, (4) expropriation risk, and (5) repudiation of 
contracts by government. Higher values of ICRG8497 correspond to better quality of institutions. 
6. ELF60: Index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1960. Measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the 
same ethno-linguistic group. Atlas Narodov Mira (1964). 
7. ETHNIC: Measure of ethnic fractionalization from data which combines racial and linguistic characteristics (based on data from the Encyclopedia Britannica 
(2001) and other sources). 
8. LANG: Measure of linguistic fractionalization based on data describing shares of languages spoken as “mother tongues” (based on data from the Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2001)). 









Institutions Geography  Fractionalization 
Model 
EXPROP8497 ICRG8497 FROST5 ZTROPICS LCR100KM ELF60 ETHNIC LANG RELIG
0  X X  X X  X X  X X  X 
1     X     X  X X         
2     X  X   X X         
3     X     X  X     X X  X 
4     X  X   X     X X  X 
5  X        X  X X         
6  X     X   X X         
7  X        X  X     X X  X 
8  X     X     X     X X  X 
 
                                                 
◊ All fundamental determinant variables were included in the set of possible threshold variables in the benchmark tree regression for development clubs and growth 
regimes (labeled as Model 0). To test for robustness, eight additional specifications (Models 1-8) were employed. In particular, all eight models include the proxy for 




Table 3: Regression Trees for Development Clubs 
 
 




1    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ELF60 > 0.605  31 1616.21 
2    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ELF60 ≤  0.605  30 4855.61  0 
3    EXPROP8497 > 8.40  23  22337.45 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  6.520, ELF60 > 0.605  29 1366.98 
2    ICRG8497 ≤  6.520, ELF60 ≤  0.605   27 4259.34 
3    6.520 < ICRG8497 ≤  7.561   9 8671.44 
1 
4    ICRG8497 > 7.561  22  22758.41 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  6.520, ELF60 > 0.605  28 1367.15 
2    ICRG8497 ≤  6.520, ELF60 ≤  0.605  28 4234.33  2 
3    ICRG8497 > 6.520  32  17376.26 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  6.570, ETHNIC > 0.671  27 1213.81 
2    ICRG8497 ≤  6.570, ETHNIC ≤  0.671  32 4129.91  3 
3    ICRG8497 > 6.570  32  17193.73 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  6.570, ETHNIC > 0.671  26 1208.43 
2    ICRG8497 ≤  6.570, ETHNIC ≤  0.671  33 4090.33 
3    6.570 < ICRG8497 ≤  7.561   9 8671.44 
4 
4    ICRG8497 > 7.561  24  22533.09 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ELF60 > 0.605  32 1607.60 
2    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ELF60 ≤  0.605  32 4732.79  5 
3    EXPROP8497 > 8.40  23  22337.45 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ELF60 > 0.605  31 1616.21 
2    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ELF60 ≤  0.605  33 4694.19  6 
3    EXPROP8497 > 8.40  24  22401.20 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ETHNIC > 0.671  28 1295.13 
2    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ETHNIC ≤  0.671  42 4693.58  7 
3    EXPROP8497 > 8.40  27  20338.28 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ETHNIC > 0.671  27 1292.72 
2    EXPROP8497 ≤  8.400, ETHNIC ≤  0.671  43 4665.08  8 










Model  MR#  Multiple Growth Regimes  Obs. 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  7.525  75 
0 
2    EXPROP8497 > 7.525  72 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  7.045  97 
1 
2    ICRG8497 > 7.045  54 
2  - No  splits  155 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  7.045  100 
3 
2    ICRG8497 >7.045  56 
1    ICRG8497 ≤  6.476  93 
4 
2    ICRG8497 >6.476  67 
5  - No  splits  151 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  7.525  81 
6 
2    EXPROP8497 > 7.525  74 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  7.525  81 
7 
2    EXPROP8497 > 7.525  75 
1    EXPROP8497 ≤  7.525  83 
8 






∇∇∇∇ : Development Clubs Country List for Models 0 to 8 (M0-M8) 
 
 
Country   M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7  M8 
                            
W. Europe & Offshoots                             
                            
Austria 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Australia 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Belgium  3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Canada 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Denmark 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Finland 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
France 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Greece 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Iceland       3     4     3     3 
Ireland 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Israel 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Italy 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Netherlands 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
New Zealand 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Norway 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Portugal 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Spain 3
+   4 3 3    3 3 3 3 
Sweden 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Switzerland 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
United Kingdom 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
United States 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
                            
                            
Asia                             
                            
Bangladesh          2  2        2  2 
China          2  2        2  2 
Hong Kong 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
India 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Korea,Republic of 3
+   3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Malaysia 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 
Pakistan 1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Papua  New  Guinea 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Philippines 1−   1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Singapore 3
+   4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Sri Lanka 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Taiwan          3  4        3  3 
Thailand 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 
                            
 
                                                 





∇∇∇∇  (cont.): Development Clubs Country List for Models 0 to 8 (M0-M8) 
 
 
Country   M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6  M7  M8
                            
Latin America & the Caribbean                             
                            
Argentina 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Bolivia 1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Brazil 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Chile 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Colombia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Costa  Rica 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Dominican Republic 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ecuador 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
El Salvador    2  2        2  2       
Guatemala 1−   1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Guyana       2     2     2     2 
Haiti    2  2        2  2       
Honduras 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Jamaica 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Mexico 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Nicaragua 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Panama 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Paraguay 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Peru 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Trinidad  &  Tobago 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Uruguay 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Venezuela 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
                            
                            
Middle East & North Africa                             
                            
Algeria 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Iran          2  2        2  2 
Jordan 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Lebanon          2  2        2  2 
Morocco 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Syrian Arab Rep. 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Tunisia 2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Turkey 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
                            
 
                                                 





∇∇∇∇  (cont.): Development Clubs Country List for Models 0 to 8 (M0-M8) 
 
 
Country   M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7  M8 
                             
Sub-Saharan Africa                             
                             
Angola     1    1    1    1    
Botswana  2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Burkina Faso  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cameroon  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Congo  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Cote  d'Ivoire  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ethiopia  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gabon  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gambia  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ghana  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Guinea  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Guinea Bissau           1  1        1  1 
Kenya  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Madagascar  2−   2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Malawi  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mali  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mozambique  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Niger  1−   1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Nigeria  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Senegal  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sierra Leone  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
South  Africa  1 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 
Tanzania  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Togo  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Uganda  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Zaire  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Zambia  1−   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Zimbabwe  2−   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
                            
 
                                                 





ϒϒϒϒ : Multiple Regimes Country List for Models 0 to 8 (M0-M8) 
 
Country  M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
                            
W. Europe & Offshoots                            
                            
Austria 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Australia 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Belgium 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Canada 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Denmark 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Finland 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
France 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Greece 2 2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Iceland       x      2     2     2 
Ireland 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Israel 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Italy 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Netherlands 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
New Zealand 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Norway 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Portugal 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Spain 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Sweden 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Switzerland 2
+   2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
United Kingdom 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
United States 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
                            
                            
Asia                            
                            
Bangladesh          1  1        1  1 
China          1  2        2  2 
Hong Kong 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
India 2
+  1 x   1 1 x   2 2 2 
Indonesia 2 1 x   1 1 x   2 2 2 
Japan 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Korea,Republic of 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Malaysia 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Pakistan 1−  1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Papua New Guinea 2  1  x   1  1  x   2  2  2 
Philippines 1−  1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Singapore 2
+  2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Sri Lanka 1−  1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Taiwan          2  2        2  2 
Thailand 2 1 x   1 2 x   2 2 2 
                            
                                                 
ϒ  Tree regressions for Models 2 and 5 turned up evidence for single regimes (“x” denotes countries for each 





ϒϒϒϒ  (cont.): Multiple Regimes Country List for Models 0 to 8 (M0-M8) 
 
Country    M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
                            
Latin America & the Caribbean                             
                            
Argentina 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Bolivia 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Brazil 2
+   1 x   1 2 x   2 2 2 
Chile 2 1 x   1 2 x   2 2 2 
Colombia 2 1 x   1 1 x   2 2 2 
Costa  Rica 1 1 x   1 2 x   1 1 1 
Dominican Republic 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Ecuador 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
El Salvador    1  x         x   1       
Guatemala 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Guyana       x      1     1     1 
Haiti    1  x         x   1       
Honduras 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Jamaica 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Mexico 2 1 x   1 1 x   2 2 2 
Nicaragua 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Panama 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Paraguay 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Peru 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Trinidad  &  Tobago 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Uruguay 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Venezuela 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
                            
                            
Middle East & North Africa                             
                            
Algeria 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Egypt 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Iran          1  1        1  1 
Jordan 1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Lebanon                           
Morocco                           
Syrian Arab Rep. 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Tunisia 1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Turkey 2 1 x   1 1 x   2 2 2 
                            
 
                                                 
ϒ  Tree regressions for Models 2 and 5 turned up evidence for single regimes. The “x” denotes countries for 









Country    M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
                             
Sub-Saharan Africa                             
                             
Angola                            
Botswana  2
+   2 x   2 2 x   2 2 2 
Burkina Faso                            
Cameroon  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Congo                            
Cote d'Ivoire                            
Ethiopia                            
Gabon                            
Gambia  2
+   1 x   1 1 x   2 2 2 
Ghana  1−   1    x  1  1  x   1  1  1 
Guinea                            
Guinea Bissau           1  1        1  1 
Kenya  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Madagascar                            
Malawi  1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Mali  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Mozambique  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Niger  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Nigeria                            
Senegal  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Sierra Leone  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
South  Africa  1 2 x   2 2 x   1 1 1 
Tanzania  1 1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Togo  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Uganda  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Zaire  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Zambia  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
Zimbabwe  1−   1 x   1 1 x   1 1 1 
                            
 
                                                 
ϒ  Tree regressions for Models 2 and 5 turned up evidence for single regimes. The “x” denotes countries for 









  MRW Model  0  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
      MR1 MR2 MR1  MR2    MR1  MR2 
                      
CONST  -0.6776 -1.3002  0.9351* -1.6275*  2.6052** -0.7405 -1.6433**  2.9880** 
  (0.4639) (0.9073)  (0.5104)  (0.8454)  (0.4881) (0.4878) (0.8233)  (0.4750) 
MNGD  -0.6869** -0.6785*  -0.3735*  -0.9172**  -0.3530** -0.5981** -0.9915**   -0.4072** 
  (0.1912) (0.3588)  (0.2193)  (0.3282)  (0.1704) (0.2048) (0.3137)  (0.1767) 
MINV  0.3206** 0.2070**  0.5375**  0.2451**   0.4700**  0.3256**  0.2701**  0.4310** 
  (0.0398) (0.0555)  (0.0657)  (0.0498)  (0.0756) (0.0440) (0.0482)  (0.0766) 
MSCH15  0.0691** 0.0432**  0.0510**  0.0508**  0.0403** 0.0538 0.0625**  0.0523** 
  (0.0150) (0.0219)  (0.0214)  (0.0211)  (0.0173) (0.1704) (0.0189)  (0.0173) 
DUM6079  0.2957** 0.3517**  0.1307**  0.3302**  -0.0264 0.2917** 0.3313**  -0.0481 
  (0.0457) (0.0729)  (0.0507)  (0.0653)  (0.0452) (0.0492) (0.0632)  (0.0463) 
MGDP0  -0.2008** -0.1073*  -0.3480** -0.1468**  -0.4905** -0.1713**  -0.1734**  -0.5333** 
  (0.0372) (0.0561)  (0.0503)  (0.0518)  (0.0469) (0.0412) (0.0487)  (0.0451) 
                      
N  176 75  72  97  54 155  100  56 
 
                                                 
+  Dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita across, respectively, the periods 1960-79 and 1980-99. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 









  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
   MR1  MR2    MR1  MR2 MR1 MR2 MR1  MR2 
                         
CONST  -1.1388  1.8841** -0.8239*  -1.1184  0.9173 -1.2772  1.1826**  -1.0719  1.1624** 
  (0.7865)  (0.5202) (0.4987) (0.8390)  (0.5010) (0.8778) (0.5315) (0.8041)  (0.5229) 
MNGD  -0.6898**  -0.4130** -0.6672**  -0.6139*  -0.3664 -0.6859** -0.4119* -0.5890*  -0.4049* 
  (0.2960)  (0.1983) (0.2140) (0.3160)  (0.2152) (0.3424) (0.2245) (0.3028)  (0.2208) 
MINV  0.2212**  0.4464**   0.3318**  0.1906**  0.5398** 0.2229** 0.5295**  0.2160**  0.5326** 
  (0.0494)  (0.0848) (0.0445) (0.0540)  (0.0644) (0.0526) (0.0693) (0.0514)  (0.0679) 
MSCH15  0.0494**  0.0527**   0.0546** 0.0408*  0.0496**   0.0436** 0.0659**  0.0419**  0.0644** 
  (0.0195)  (0.0195) (0.0172) (0.0221)  (0.0210) (0.0200) (0.0213) (0.0197)  (0.0207) 
DUM6079  0.3234**  0.0500   0.2901**  0.3231**  0.1321** 0.3226** 0.1249** 0.3167**  0.1263** 
  (0.0650)  (0.0492) (0.0498) (0.0720)  (0.0496) (0.0695) (0.0520) (0.0683)  (0.0510) 
MGDP0  -0.1292**  -0.4268** -0.1850**  -0.1023*  -0.3447** -0.1148** -0.3822** -0.1074**  -0.3790** 
  (0.0513)  (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0544)  (0.0486) (0.0535) (0.0460) (0.0522)  (0.0446) 
                         





                                                 
+  Dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita across, respectively, the periods 1960-79 and 1980-99. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 
specifications are described in Table 1. “**” indicates significance at the 5% level while “*” indicates significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2005 
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/papers.html 
 
2005-01  EGGLESTON, Karen, Keqin RAO and Jian WANG; “From Plan 
to Market in the Health Sector? China's Experience.” 
2005-02  SHIMSHACK Jay; “Are Mercury Advisories Effective? 
Information, Education, and Fish Consumption.”  
2005-03  KIM, Henry and Jinill KIM; “Welfare Effects of Tax Policy in 
Open Economies: Stabilization and Cooperation.” 
2005-04  KIM, Henry, Jinill KIM and Robert KOLLMANN; “Applying 
Perturbation Methods to Incomplete Market Models with 
Exogenous Borrowing Constraints.” 
2005-05  KIM, Henry, Jinill KIM, Ernst SCHAUMBURG and Christopher 
A. SIMS; “Calculating and Using Second Order Accurate 
Solutions of Discrete Time Dynamic Equilibrium Models.” 
2005-06  KIM, Henry, Soyoung KIM and Yunjong WANG; “International 
Capital Flows and Boom-Bust Cycles in the Asia Pacific Region.” 
2005-07  KIM, Henry, Soyoung KIM and Yunjong WANG; “Fear of 
Floating in East Asia.” 
2005-08  SCHMIDHEINY, Kurt; “How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens 
Progressive Taxes.” 
2005-09  SCHMIDHEINY, Kurt; “Segregation from Local Income Taxation 
When Households Differ in Both Preferences and Incomes.” 2005-10  DURLAUF, Steven N., Andros KOURTELLOS, and Chih Ming 
TAN; “How Robust Are the Linkages between Religiosity and 
Economic Growth?” 
2005-11  KEELY, Louise C. and Chih Ming TAN; “Understanding 
Preferences For Income Redistribution.” 
2005-12  TAN, Chih Ming; “No One True Path: Uncovering the Interplay 
between Geography, Institutions, and Fractionalization in 
Economic Development.” 
2005-13  IOANNIDES, Yannis and Esteban ROSSI-HANSBERG; “Urban 
Growth.” 
2005-14  PATERSON, Robert W. and Jeffrey E. ZABEL; “The Effects of 
Critical Habitat Designation on Housing Supply: An Analysis of 
California Housing Construction Activity.” 
2005-15  KEELY, Louise C. and Chih Ming TAN; “Understanding 
Divergent Views on Redistribution Policy in the United States.” 
2005-16  DOWNES, Tom and Shane GREENSTEIN; “Understanding Why 
Universal Service Obligations May Be Unnecessary: The Private 
Development of Local Internet Access Markets.” 
2005-17  CALVO-ARMENGOL, Antoni and Yannis M. IOANNIDES; 
“Social Networks in Labor Markets.” 
2005-18  IOANNIDES, Yannis M.; “Random Graphs and Social Networks: 
An Economics Perspective.” 
2005-19  METCALF, Gilbert E.; “Tax Reform and Environmental 
Taxation.” 
2005-20  DURLAUF, Steven N., Andros KOURTELLOS, and Chih Ming 
TAN; “Empirics of Growth and Development.” 
2005-21  IOANNIDES, Yannis M. and Adriaan R. SOETEVENT; “Social 
Networking and Individual Outcomes Beyond the Mean Field 
Case.” 2005-22  CHISHOLM, Darlene and George NORMAN; “When to Exit a 
Product: Evidence from the U.S. Motion-Pictures Exhibition 
Market.” 
2005-23  CHISHOLM, Darlene C., Margaret S. McMILLAN and George 
NORMAN; “Product Differentiation and Film Programming 
Choice: Do First-Run Movie Theatres Show the Same Films?” 
2005-24  METCALF, Gilbert E. and Jongsang PARK; “A Comment on the 
Role of Prices for Excludable Public Goods.” 